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RECENT CASE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-STATE STATUTE MAY NOT FORBID A
PUTATIVE FATHER FROM SUING FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF HIS
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.
Seventeen-year-old Terry Holden, an illegitimate child, died as the
result of injuries sustained when the automobile in which she was a
passenger left the highway and struck a tree. She left neither a will
nor known surviving distributees. After her death, Earl Holden was
appointed administrator of her estate with limited letters, and sought
to maintain a wrongful death action against the operator (deceased)
and the owner of the vehicle in which Miss Holden had been mortally
injured. The defense asserted that only surviving distributees could
maintain a suit for wrongful death under New York State law, and
that Miss Holden was not so survived.1 The term "distributee" is
statutorily defined in the New York Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law
(EPTL) to exclude putative fathers of illegitimates, unless a filiation
order to establish paternity has been entered within two years of the
child's birth.2 While Earl Holden claimed to be the illegtimate's
1. The New York wrongful death statute provides:
The personal representative, duly appointed in this state or any other
jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees may maintain an
action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default which
caused the decedent's death against a person who would have been liable
to the decedent by reason of such wrongful conduct if death had not
ensued....
N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW [hereinafter cited as EPTL] § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
2. The EPTL defines "distributee" as "a person entitled to take or share in the
property of a decedent under the statutes governing descent and distribution." Id.
§ 1-2.5. The statute also provides:
(a) For the purposes of this article:
(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he
and his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he
and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has,
during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity
in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two
years from the birth of the child.
(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the
illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the
father in the absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by sub-
paragraph (2).
(b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother,
maternal kindred and father inherit and are entitled to letters of administra-
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father, his paternity had never been established by an order of filiation,
and no judicial proceeding had ever been instituted to establish a
legal relationship between the putative father and illegitimate daugh-
ter. However, Earl Holden's name appeared on the illegitimate's birth
and baptismal certificates. Miss Holden had lived with her putative
father and his wife almost from birth, had been openly and completely
acknowledged by him, and bore his name. Under these circumstances,
plaintiff contended that the sections of the EPTL in question were
unconstitutional, in that they denied equal protection of the law-
they were arbitrary and set up an invidious discrimination. The New
York State Supreme Court, at special term, granted a defense motion
to dismiss the wrongful death action, concluding that the statute did
not set forth an arbitrary classification. On appeal, the Appellate Divi-
sion reversed. Held: Earl Holden should be treated as a distributee for
the purpose of maintaining this suit for wrongful death. EPTL sec-
tions 4-1.2 (a)(2) and (b) are unconstitutional as applied under the
facts of this case in that it creates an invidious discrimination between
legitimates and illegitimates by requiring that an order of filiation be
entered before a putative father or his illegitimate child may be treated
as a distributee of the other. Holden v. Alexander, 39 App. Div. 2d
476, 336 N.Y.S. 2d 649 (2d Dep't 1972).
The right of action for wrongful death is constitutionally pro-
tected in New York, but the state constitution says nothing about who
may bring the action or who may recover damages.3 Under prior law,
the right to sue for wrongful death was interwoven with the right of
intestate succession by identical classification of the groups entitled
to benefit in each case.4 As the right of illegitimates to inherit was
narrowly circumscribed, so also was their right to recover for wrongful
death.
tion as if the decedent were legitimate, provided that the father may inherit or
obtain such letters only if an order of filiation has been made in accordance
with the provisions of subparagraph (2).
Id. § 4-1.2.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16 provides:
The right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting
in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable shall
not be subject to any statutory limitation.
4. Ch. 919 [1920] Laws of New York 2352, as amended, ch. 639 [1949] Laws of
New York 1468, construed in Battalico v. Knickerbocker Fireproofing Co., 250 App.
Div. 258, 294 N.Y.S. 481 (3d Dep't 1937); FOURTH REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE
COMMISSION ON LAW OF ESTATES, N.Y. LEO. Doe. No. 19, at 240 (1965) [herein-
after cited as FOURTi REPORT].
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Anglo-American law historically distinguished between legitimate
and illegitimate children. 5 At common law, illegitimates were defined
as children born before celebration of a lawful marriage.6 Such chil-
dren were treated as filius nullius, the children of no one.7 As illegiti-
mates, they had few rights.8 Specifically, they had no claim to inheri-
tance from either parent.9 In his classic treatise on the common law,
Blackstone justified the existence of this scheme on the ground that
it served the ends of "establishing the contract of marriage, taken in a
civil light, . . which has nothing to do with the legitimacy or illegiti-
macy of the children."'1 In essence, he argued that society and the
state had an interest in marriage sufficiently strong to justify laws
favoring the rights of legitimate children at the expense of the rights
of illegitimate children. The causal connection between the harsh
laws dealing with illegitimates and the state's interest in fostering the
institution of marriage was apparently so clear to Blackstone that
he merely asserted its existence without an examination of its
validity.
Some of the harshness of the common law has been modified by
statute in each of the United States, especially as these statutes deal
with the relations between illegitimate children and their mothers.'
However, significant disadvantages for illegitimates remain. This is
particularly true in the area of reciprocal rights and obligations be-
tween putative fathers and their illegitimate children. Presumably this
resulted because the very issue of paternity may be contested, and its
proof is difficult1
2
5. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 155 (1968) explores some possible
explanations for the early emphasis on the distinction, as well as its longevity.
6. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COIMIIMENTARIES *454.
7. Id. at *459; FOURTin REPORT, supra note 4, at 235.
8. H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 155, 178.
9. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *459.
10. Id. at *455.
11. H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 158-61. Most states now permit illegitimates to
inherit from their mothers or through the maternal line. Krause, Bringing the Bastard
Into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TE.XAs L. REv. 829
(1966).
12. Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inheritance, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 75 Dscm. L. REv. 377, 378 (1971). The history of New York legislation
concerning the claim of illegitimate children to support by their fathers is an excellent
example of diminished but persistent discrimination in such cases. It is conveniently
reviewed in "Storm" v. "None", 57 Misc. 2d 342, 343-46, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517-19
(Fain. Ct. 1968). In this context, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has
recently refused to rule on the constitutionality of a Texas statute which makes failure
of a parent to support a legitimate child a misdemeanor but imposes no duty on the
parent of an illegitimate child. In a 5-4 decision, the Court dismissed the complaint on
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New York originally followed the common law rule that an ille-
gitimate had no right to inherit from either parent.13 The harshness
of this rule was first modified in 1855 when illegitimate children were
given the right to inherit from their mother, but only if she was not
survived by a spouse, legitimate children, or descendants. Moreover,
the illegitimate child was still not permitted to inherent from the
mother's kindred.14 If the illegitimate died leaving no issue or spouse,
his mother might inherit from him.15 The statute did not provide a
right of intestate succession by an illegitimate from his putative father
or by the father from his illegitimate child.'6
In 1966, after lengthy study,'7 the New York Decedent Estate
Law pertaining to illegitimate intestate succession and wrongful death
actions was substantially revised, and the revisions were carried forward
into the present EPTL. The statutory changes broadened the inheri-
tance rights to and from illegitimate children. At the same time, they
continued to define the class of persons permitted recovery in -wrong-
ful death actions as encompassing the entire class of those considered
distributees for the purpose of inheritance. Suit for wrongful death
may now be maintained by the duly appointed personal representative
of a decedent when he is survived by distributees.18 The connection
to inheritance is provided by the definition of distributees as persons
"entitled to take or share in the property of a decedent under the
statutes governing descent and distribution."' 0 A special provision deals
with inheritance by and from illegitimates. 20 The child is deemed to
the ground that the mother of an illegitimate had no standing to raise the issue. Linda
R. S. v. Richard D., 41 U.S.L.W. 4371 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1973).
13. For a detailed discussion of the history of New York law on inheritance by
the illegitimate child see Note, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REv. 45 (1960) and
FOURTH REPORT, supra note 4, at 239-40. New York law is compared to that of Wis-
consin in Note, Rights of a Putative Father in Relation to His Illegitimate Child: A
Question of Equal Protection, 22 SYRAcuSE L. REv. 470 (1970).
14. FOURTH REPORT 243; ch. 547 [1855] Laws of New York 1046 as amended
N.Y. EPTL § 4-1.2(a) (1) (McKinney 1967); In re Cady's Estate, 257 App. Div. 129,
12 N.Y.S.2d 750 (3d Dep't), afJ'd, 281 N.Y. 688, 23 N.E.2d 18 (1939).
15. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 958, as amended, N.Y. EPTL § 4-1.2(a)(1)
(McKinney 1967).
16. See "Saks" v. "Saks", 189 Misc. 667, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Faro. Ct. 1947).
17. FOURTH REPORT, supra note 4.
18. N.Y. EPTL § 5-4.1 (McKinney 1967).
19. Id. § 1-2.5.
20. Id. § 4-1.2. It should be noted that while the rights of illegitimates to inherit
have been expanded, the class of illegitimates who have benefited has been narrowing.
Provisions in other statutes have operated to increase the number of circumstances




be the legitimate child of his mother and so may inherit from her;
the right is also extended to include inheritance from maternal kin-
dred.2' When an illegitimate child dies unmarried and without chil-
dren, his mother or her kindred may inherit from such child.22 On
the other hand, an illegitimate child may only inherit from his father
if a filiation order-a declaration of paternity issued by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction-is filed during the father's life. The filiation pro-
ceedings must be instituted during the mother's pregnancy or within
two years of the birth of the child.23 Although the filiation order per-
mits the putative father to inherit from his illegitimate child, the
right of intestate succession still does not extend to or from the
father's kindred.
24
The strict requirement of a filiation order has been the subject
of much dispute. The commission which recommended the 1966
changes in the Decedent Estate Law deemed it a necessary precau-
tion to protect innocent men from the possibility of. unjust paternity
claims and to protect the inheritance of legitimate distributees. 25 The
commission's report concluded that other suggested alternatives would
afford "considerable opportunity for falsification of evidence and
[would] invit[e] harassing litigation .... "26 Informal acknowledgement
by the putative father, which is acceptable in many jurisdictions, 27 was
explicitly rejected as an alternative to the filiation order. Judicial
orders of support were likewise deemed insufficient unless they spe-
cifically included a finding of paternity.28 There have been recent at-
tempts to modify the filiation order requirement. In January of 1972,
a bill was introduced into the New York Legislature which would
have added a properly executed, acknowledged and recorded affidavit
of paternity as an alternative to the filiation order, but it failed to gain
approval.
29
While New York was reconsidering its wrongful death and in-
21. N.Y. EPTL § 4-1.2(a) (1) (McKinney 1967).
22. Id. § 4-1.2(b).
23. Id. § 4-1.2(a) (2).
24. Id. § 4-1.2(b).
25. FOURTH REPORT 266.
26. Id. at 267.
27. A convenient summary of the requirements of several states may be found id.
at 260-62. Some states require clear assertions of paternity which must be witnessed or
notarized. Others accept any writing by the father which manifests a clear acknowledg-
ment of paternity.
28. Id. at 267.
29. A. 8788, 195th Sess. (1972).
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testate succession statutes, cases involving restrictive Louisiana statutes
on these subjects were making their way to the United States Su-
preme Court. The gravamen of the complaints in Levy v. Louisiana,0
and its companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee Co.,31 was that
the Louisiana wrongful death statute discriminated against illegitimates
and their parents, and thus deprived them of equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment.82 The Supreme Court held that wrongful
death statutes which excluded illegitimates from the ambit of those
who may recover for the death of their mother (Levy), or excluded
mothers from recovery for the wrongful death of their illegitimate
children (Glona), were violative of the constitutional mandates of
equal protection. Although the holdings of Levy and Glona seem
quite clear, the rationale employed does not. Thus, while both de-
cisions have been hailed as harbingers of the end of all statutory dis-
crimination against illegitimates and their parents, there has been a
strong undercurrent of discontent that the results were marred by
carelessly drawn opinions.33
Speaking for a six-man majority in Levy, Justice Douglas first out-
lined the classic principles of equal protection. A state has broad power
to establish classifications, but "it may not draw a line which constitutes
an invidious discrimination against" individuals or groups; the lines
drawn must be rational, and there must be a justifiable connection be-
tween the state interest to be served and the classifications to be estab-
lished.34 Thus, the primary inquiry in Levy was an examination of the
connection between Louisiana's wrongful death statute and its as-
serted purpose. Did excluding illegitimates from the class of those en-
titled to recover for wrongful death further the state's asserted pur-
poses to foster marriage and discourage out-of-wedlock births? The
Supreme Court concluded that it did not:
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature
of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother... It is invidious to
30. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
31. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
32. For an excellent analysis of the rationale and implications of these decisions
see Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions
on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cii. L. Rnv. 338 (1969).
33. See, e.g., Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy
v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1969); Petrillo, supra note 12, at 380-83.
34. 391 U.S. at 71.
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discriminate against them [the illegitimate children] when no action,
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that
was done the mother.35
Thus, insofar as the Louisiana wrongful death statute prohibits suit
by illegitimates for the death of their mothers, it sets up an unconsti-
tutional invidious discrimination against these children and violates
their right to equal protection.
In Glona, the Court examined the same statute, but this time
focused on its exclusion of mothers of illegitimates from the class of
those permitted to sue for the wrongful death of such children. Once
again, the Court relied upon equal protection demanding an examina-
tion of the relation between the lines drawn in the statute and the state
purpose that the statute was designed to serve. Here, as in Levy, the
Court rejected Louisiana's arguments:
[N]o possible rational basis [exists] for assuming that if the natural
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It would, indeed, be
farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that
they can be compensated in damages for their death.36
Thus, both Levy and Glona concluded that the state's purpose in en-
couraging marriage and discouraging illegitimate conception was not
sufficient to justify the discrimination against illegitimates and their
mothers found in Louisiana's wrongful death statute.
It is difficult to determine the full significance of Levy and Glona.
Some of their language is very broad and appeared to warrant the con-
clusion reached by one study "that Levy and Glona provide a basis
from which all the major legal disadvantages suffered by reason of
illegitimacy can be challenged successfully." 37 Nevertheless, the implica-
tions of these two opinions are not at all clear. Neither opinion articu-
lated the specific standard employed in reaching the conclusion that the
Louisiana statutory classifications in question represented invidious
discrimination. The Levy opinion notes that the Court "[has] been
extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights . ,"3s If this
means that Levy involved protected civil rights, the Court never de-
lineated what specific rights were involved. We are told that "[t]he
35. Id. at 72.
36. 391 U.S. at 75.
37. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 33, at 2.
38. 391 U.S. at 71.
1117
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between
a child and his own mother."39 This may imply a right to privacy
within the family unit, or perhaps a right to have children without suf-
fering legal discrimination, or it may imply no more than the right to
sue for wrongful death. Further, the Court did not make clear whether
the Levy-Glona rationale should be extended to include putative
fathers of illegitimate children. In Glona, Justice Douglas stressed that
the biological relationship between child and mother was the signifi-
cant connection. But we are not told whether this biological rela-
tionship test would apply also in the case of a putative father. Finally,
the Levy and Glona opinions leave unclear whether their reasoning
would be applicable to statutes dealing with intestate succession.
Notwithstanding the potential for reform in the area of illegiti-
mates' rights that was opened by Levy and Glona, the Supreme Court
itself stopped short and refused to extend the equal protection argu-
ment to the issue of inheritance. In Labine v. Vincent,40 the Court up-
held Louisiana's statutory scheme barring an illegitimate child from
sharing in the estate of her deceased natural father. The majority and
dissent both agreed that the Louisiana statute "discriminates" against
illegitimates. However, the majority asserted that laws may often per-
missibly discriminate between groups. Referring to the result in Levy,
the Court asserted that it "did not say and cannot fairly be read to say
that a State can never treat an illegitimate child differently from legiti-
mate off-spring." 41 Further, the Court felt that the issue in Levy was
distinguishable from the problem in Labine. The latter case posed no
absolute state bar to inheritance by the child such as existed in the
case of wrongful death recovery. The father could have done any one
of several things to assure his illegitimate child inheritance rights.42
The major concern in Levy and Glona-that the child was barred from
recovery due to actions of his parents which he was helpless to control
-is not'directly discussed. The four members of the Court dissenting
from the Labine majority bitterly charged:
The Court . . . resorts to the startling measure of simply excluding
illegitimate children from the protection of the [Equal Protection]
Clause, in order to uphold the untenable and discredited moral preju-
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
41. Id. at 536.
42. Id. at 539.
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dice of bygone centuries which vindictively punished not only the ille-
gitimates' parents, but also the hapless, and innocent, children.
Based upon such a premise, today's decision cannot even pretend to
be a principled decision.
43
The Supreme Court was able to avoid extending the equal pro-
tection rationale to Labine by finding that the statute in question had
a rational basis founded upon a valid state interest: promoting family
life and directing the distribution of property within the state's borders.
However, the Court had rejected the sufficiency of promoting marriage
as a possible basis for wrongful death statutes operating unequally on
legitimates and illegitimates. There is no reason given (and none is
apparent) why this argument should succeed in an inheritance con-
text any more than in a wrongful death situation. Likewise, the Court
did not carefully examine the traditional notion that states have very
strong interests in directing the distribution of property within their
borders. The opinion merely asserts that permitting illegitimate inheri-
tance through intestate succession would prejudice this state interest.
In the final analysis, it is quite difficult to determine why an equal
protection analysis applied in the case of wrongful death recovery and
not in the case of inheritance.
Since the specific standard used in Levy and Glona went unde-
lineated, and the decision in Labine seemed to halt further extensions
of the equal protection rationale in this area, the implications of the
Levy-Glona opinions remain unclear. If these cases merely mean that
any peculiar remnants of discrimination in the maternal relationship
are now barred, they should have limited impact. Most states have
already equalized the postion of legitimates and illegitimates, vis-t-vis
the mother, for purposes of wrongful death recovery and intestate suc-
cession. 44 In New York, for example, statutory provisions already permit
both wrongful death recovery and intestate succession by an illegiti-
mate child from its mother and her kindred, and they permit the
mother to similarly benefit if she survives her illegitimate child.45 Both
the Levy and Glona opinions, however, employ extraordinarily ex-
pansive language. Looking to this broad language, how far it may be
extended is debatable.
43. Id. at 541. For a fuller discussion and criticism of the Labine opinion see
Petrillo, supra note 7.
44. H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 179; FOURTH REPORT passim.
45. N.Y. EPTL §§ 5-4.1, 1-2.5, 4-1.2(a)(1) (McKinney 1967).
1119
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Appellate courts outside New York State have now extended the
equal protection doctrine to cover paternal relationships. On remand
of Levy, 46 the Louisiana Supreme Court assumed that the United
States Supreme Court's equal protection analysis applied to the rela-
tionships of both mothers and fathers with their illegitimate children.
New Jersey's wrongful death statute, permitting recovery by an ille-
gitimate child for the death of the mother, but not the father, was de-
clared unconstitutional.4 7 The New Jersey court reasoned that the un-
derlying principle of Levy reached the father-illegitimate child rela-
tionships for purposes of wrongful death recovery. At the same time,
several New York courts of primary jurisdiction have grappled with the
problem of defining illegitimates' rights to inheritance and wrongful
death recovery. In some wrongful death cases they have extended the
Levy-Glona rationale to the paternal relationship.4"
The instant case arose against this background. The Holden con-
troversy was the first time in any context that the relevant provisions
of the EPTL had been examined by an appellate court in light of
the equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
The Holden opinion rests first upon the mandate of equal pro-
tection in the federal constitution and then upon the particular fact
situation involved in the case itself. The court reviewed the facts and
relevant statutes and then turned its attention to the recent Supreme
Court decisions. Although Levy and Glona dealt with wrongful death
statutes in the context of mother-illegitimate child rights, the deci-
sions were viewed as "valuable guides" to reaching the determination
here.49 Holden carefully delineates the distinction between the situa-
46. 253 La. 73, 216 So. 2d 818 (1968).
47. Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969). See also R- v. R-,
431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968) which comes to the same conclusion in a case involving
child support.
48. In re Estate of Perez, 69 Misc. 2d 538, 330 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sur. Ct. 1972)
(written acknowledgment sufficient to permit wrongful death recovery); In re Estate
of Ross, 67 Misc. 2d 320, 323 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sur. Ct. 1971) (mother and illegitimate
daughter given letters of administration jointly); In re Estate of Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d
756, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sur. Ct. 1969) (illegitimates permitted recovery in suit for
wrongful death of their father). There are miscellaneous New York judicial decisions
relying upon extensions of the Levy-Glona rationale in contexts other than wrongful
death. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 63 Misc. 2d 1058, 314 N.Y.S.2d
188 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (right to proceeds of an insurance policy); In re Anonymous,
60 Misc. 2d 163, 302 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Sur. Ct. 1969) (inheritance). Both of these latter
cases were decided before Labine.
49. Holden v. Alexander, 39 App. Div. 2d 476, 478, 336 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652
[hereinafter cited as instant case].
1120
RECENT CASE
tion of the mother and the father of an illegitimate child. At the same
time, it quotes with favor the Levy conclusion that "[l]egitimacy or
illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong al-
legedly inflicted on the mother."50 The court also looked to the Glona
stricture that a
law which creates an open season on illegitimates in the area of
automobile accidents gives a windfall to tortfeasors .... To say that
the test of equal protection should be "legal" rather than the bio-
logical relationship is to avoid the issue.51
The Holden court concluded that a state might constitutionally dis-
criminate between legitimates and illegitimates when dealing with
intestate succession, but it may not discriminate when dealing with
wrongful death actions, at least between mother and child.52
The court then determined that anaylsis of other decisions" and
examination of the facts in the case at bar sufficiently supported the ex-
tension of the Levy-Glona doctrine to the father-child relationship here.
That relationship was very different from the usual case where the
putative father rarely sees the child he has sired and may, at most,
merely furnish some financial support. The relationship between Mr.
Holden and his daughter was "that of parent and child, and the bond
between them could not have been made any stronger by an order of
filiation." 54 Mr. Holden openly acknowledged his paternity. The court
specifically found that "although no order of filiation was entered,
still, under these facts and in accordance with the modem trend in the
law 'to abolish the unchosen birth-given shackles of illegitimacy and
to confer filial equality wherever possible,' ,55 Mr. Holden should be
permitted to maintain a suit for wrongful death. In support of this
conclusion, the court declared sections 4-1.2 (a)(2) and (b) of the
EPTL unconstitutional as applied and limited to the facts of the
Holden case. Following the mandate of Labine, the constitutionality
of the application of these sections to questions of intestate succession
was specifically upheld. In the final analysis, any contrary holding
would seem not only to create a windfall for tort-feasors who
happen to be fortunate enough to have committed their tortious acts
50. Id., citing Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
51. Instant case at 479, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 652, citing Glona, 391 U.S. at 75-76.
52. Instant case at 479, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
53. See note 48 supra.




against illegitimates .... but also to render a gross injustice to this
particular plaintiff, who would have suffered a wrong without being
provided any remedy.56
Law and equity, therefore, were deemed to favor permitting the suit
for wrongful death by the putative father.
The Holden decision's declaration that EPTL section 4-1.2 (b)
was unconstitutional under the facts of this case amounted to legislating
away the requirement of a filiation order. Yet, the court had other al-
ternatives open to it. For example, it might have considered the two-
year limit as in the nature of a statute of limitations for the protection
of the putative father. Since Mr. Holden did not assert it, the time re-
quirement was of no import. Or, it might have argued that since the
filiation order was merely a procedural requirement designed to pro-
tect other distributees, it had no effect in a case where there were no
other distributees and where paternity was so clearly established. Cer-
tainly, it was not intended to be asserted as a defense by a possible
tortfeasor who was clearly not included within the group the statutory
safeguard was designed to protect.
However, the court chose not to dispose of the case without con-
sideration of the issues raised in light of the equal protection clause. It
read the Supreme Court decisions in Levy and Glona as requiring
substantive review of statutory schemes for wrongful death recovery.
Following the equal protection approach of these two cases, the first
step for the Holden court should have been a clear determination of
the precise classifications created by the statute. Only then could the
court decide whether the establishment of these classes set up an in-
vidious discrimination in favor of one group at the expense of another.
The court examined the classes of legitimates and illegitimates and
found that the statute discriminated against the latter group.57 How-
ever, the classifications set forth in the opinion are themselves open
to criticism.
Some illegitimates, whose paternity has been established by an
order of filiation within two years of their birth, are not excluded
from the definition of distributees under the statute. Alternatively,
if in fact a filiation order is obtained within the time set forth, a wrong-
ful death action could be maintained by a putative father for the death
56. Id. at 482, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 655. This argument may have limited effect in
states with compulsory insurance laws.
57. Id. at 481, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
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of his illegitimate child. Thus, New York law does raise an absolute
bar against putative fathers or their offspring. Further, the court
might have found that the discrimination took place in the different
treatment given to illegitimates and their fathers where a filiation order
existed as opposed to treatment received by illegitimates and their
putative fathers where no judicial order of filiation has been secured.
In fact, despite the broad assertion that the New York statute set up
an invidious distinction between legitimates and illegitimates, the
thrust of the Holden opinion compared father-illegitimate child rela-
tions with mother-illegitimate child relationships. The conclusion
reached was that rights granted by statute to the latter relationship,
in the case of wrongful death recovery, must also be granted to the
former. For this one purpose it was found that the equal protection
analysis of Levy and Glona must be extended to cover the paternal
relationship in Holden.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, although not dealing with
wrongful death statutes, have interpreted Levy to extend to paternal
relationships with illegitimate children. At the same time, they imply
that the limit to equal protection found in Labine will not have bear-
ing in contexts other than inheritance. Stanley v. Illinois5s involved
the claim by a father of illegitimates that he was entitled to the same
custody hearing provided for mothers of illegitimates before his chil-
dren could become state wards. In holding for the father, the Court
primarily relied upon a due process analysis, but it also looked to
the Levy and Glona opinions. It reasoned that illegitimacy does not
necessarily determine the strength of familial bonds, and that the bio-
logical relationship is central to determination in such cases. As the
Court noted, "[t]hese authorities make it clear that, at the least, Stan-
ley's interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and
substantial.""9 In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,60 the Supreme
Court held that, under the Louisiana workmen's compensation law, the
state's denial of equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged
illegitimate children violated equal protection. The State had argued
that Weber should be distinguished from Levy on two grounds. First,
Levy involved a statute absolutely barring recovery by illegitimates
while the workmen's compensation law merely put illegitimates in a less
58. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
59. Id. at 651.
60. 406 U.S. 165 (1972).
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favorable position than legitimates. Second, Weber was not a tort action
in which a possible tortfeasor would go free if recovery were denied.
The Supreme Court had no difficulty dismissing these arguments:
We do not think Levy can be disposed of by such finely carved
distinctions. The Court in Levy was not so much concerned with the
tortfeasor going free as with the equality of treatment under the
statutory recovery scheme. Here, as in Levy, there is impermissible dis-
crimination. 61
Thus, although the precise holdings in Stanley and Weber were rela-
tively narrow, the reasoning employed in each case would seem to sup-
port the Holden court's extension of the Levy-Glona rationale.
Once the classifications are recognized and delineated, the equal
protection approach requires an examination of the state purpose of-
fered in justification of the statutory discrimination. In essence, Levy
and Glona raise the question of state interest on the issue of illegiti-
macy and wrongful death recovery to a constitutional level. The
commission which framed the statutory provisions currently found
in section 4-1.2 of the EPTL specifically stated the purpose of the
legislation. It was intended "to grant to illegitimates, in so far as
practicable, rights of inheritance on a par with those enjoyed by legiti-
mate children while protecting innocent adults and those rightfully
interested in their estates from fraudulent claims of heirship" and the
lengthy litigation such claims would entail.62 It may also be argued that
the present statute serves the purpose of preventing fraudulent claims
at the death of illegitimate children by wrongful means. The signifi-
cant question now is whether these ends are reasonably served by the
means chosen in the statute. The generally ignored closing paragraph
of the Glona decision is instructive here. Addressing itself specifically
to suits for the wrongful death of illegitimate children brought by
their mothers, the Court stated:
Opening the courts to suits of this kind may conceivably be a
temptation to some to assert motherhood [fatherhood] fraudulently.
That problem, however, concerns burden of proof. Where the claimant
is plainly the mother [father], the State denies equal protection of
the laws to withhold relief merely because the child, wrongfully killed,
was born to her [him] out of wedlock.
3
61. Id. at 169.
62. FOURTH REPORT 265.
63. 391 U.S. at 76.
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A careful reading of this conclusion would seem to indicate that, once
parenthood has in fact been established, there is no state purpose
which could legitimately be used to justify discriminations against
illegitimates and their parents in cases of wrongful death.
The equal protection analysis assumes that the putative father is,
in fact, the natural father of an illegitimate. A somewhat different
problem arises when a state statute attempts to set up a strict standard
for proof of paternity as New York has done by the filiation order
requirement. The order requirement can be deemed no more than
a procedural safeguard against unjust claims and costly litigation. Be-
cause there is action a putative father can take to obtain an adjudica-
tion of paternity, the filiation order requirement is not an absolute
bar to his recovery. However, Weber easily dismissed this kind of super-
ficial analysis.04 Further, from the point of view of the illegitimate
child, the filiation order places it at the mercy of its parents. If its
mother or father does not secure a filiation order within two years of
its birth, there is nothing the child can do to remedy the situation.
Thus, the child will be denied equal protection because legitimates
may sue without having to overcome a lack of action on the part of a
third-party before the child was old enough to act for itself. This is
essentially the reasoning pursued in the Levy opinion. Just as Glona
mandated an extension of Levy to the parent, so too the conclusion that
the statutory requirement is unconstitutional ought to be extended
to include the father.
There are many avenues for legislative revision open to the New
York Legislature. The first step is the redefinition of "distributees"
in the EPTL so that one class may sue for wrongful death and an-
other may claim intestate succession. The State Legislature has abso-
lute discretion to prescribe that there be one class of beneficiaries to
inherit and another to benefit from suits for wrongful death. It has
been said that the fact that the legislature decided to include the same
people in each class "has no significance."6 5 Actually, this may be very
significant. On the one hand, the 1966 statutory changes broadened
inheritance rights by and from illegitimates. On the other hand, by
again subjecting the right to wrongful death recovery to the strict
standard for putative fathers, the statute incorporated safeguards de-
64. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 165, 169 (1972).




signed for the problem of inheritance. Recovery for wrongful death
in New York is subject to proof of actual pecuniary loss." Therefore, it
is possible to argue that the necessity for a strict proof requirement of
biological relationship may be less than .in the case of contested inheri-
tance.67 Furthermore, at least in theory, the recovery of one party for
wrongful death does not necessarily restrict the recovery of any other
wronged party.6 8 Redefinition of distributees in the EPTL would not
be necessary if the legislature were willing to have no requirement in
the law for proof of paternity. But in view of the legislature's hesitancy
to broaden the present definition this seems unlikely. Further, in some
earlier cases, courts declared EPTL section 5-4.1 unconstitutional as
applied to particular fact situations. 69 Holden struck down section
4-1.2 of the EPTL as applied. Should the legislature now reconsider
the definition of distributees, the issue of which section of the EPTL
is unconstitutional could be resolved.
The question of substantive amendment is much harder than these
preliminary problems. Glona's use of the phrase "burden of proof" in
its closing paragraph 70 may imply that the Supreme Court will accept
a standard somewhat stricter than that suggested by the common "more
probable than not" formulation. It is reasonable to concede that de-
termination of paternity is often difficult. The state may have some
interest in preventing endless litigation, as well as in protecting men
from unjust paternity claims. Some minimum proof standard for as-
certaining paternity might be acceptable. But, how far the legislature
may go without violating the equal protection doctrine is not clear.1
66. N.Y. EPTL § 5-4.3 (McKinney 1967).
67. Often in determining recovery, the relationship to the decedent is one of
the elements to be considered. This is particularly true when dealing with specula-
tive damages such as loss of support. See Linseed King, 48 F.2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1930),
aff'd sub nom. In re Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc., 52 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1931), rev'd
on other grounds, 285 U.S. 502 (1932); Meekin v. Brooklyn Heights Ry., 164 N.Y.
145, 58 N.E. 50 (1900). The same may be said of loss of inheritance. See, In re
Estate of Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d 756, 762, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (Sur. Ct. 1969);
Speiser, Loss of Inheritance in Wrongful Death Cases, 38 N.Y.S.B.J. 265 (1966).
68. The Holden court used this argument. However, it is possible that the amount
of insurance available to pay any recovery awarded could be insufficient to cover the
amount of the award.
69. See note 48 supra.
70. 391 U.S. at 76.
71. It must be noted that the dissent in Labine, written by Justice Brennan and
joined by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall, specifically referred to the present New
York statute. While the implication is not clear, the dissent appears to distinguish New
York's statute from Louisiana's, since it does not completely deny illegitimates the rights
of inheritance from their mothers that it grants to legitimates. The dissenters in Labine
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Certainly anything that acts as a complete bar to illegitimate children
could not stand. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Su-
preme Court might accept an informal acknowledgment requirement
which, if not executed or displayed, would serve to bar later actions
by the putative father. Illegitimate children would have to be granted
time to take some action on their own behalves to determine their
paternity before reaching twenty-one or some other appropriate age.
New York might also be well-advised to consider a statute requiring
that a public official attempt to determine paternity whenever an il-
legitimate child is born.72 This kind of statute might have a signifi-
cant salutary effect upon the illegitimate's rights in wrongful death
actions, and in areas such as support or adoption as well.
In the meantime, it is clear that there is a trend in the case law
at both the state and federal levels to provide some measure of equal
status for the illegitimate and its natural parents. The concept of the
bastard as the child of no one is a relic of the past. An enlightened
society should not long countenance second-class treatment for the
innocent child born out of wedlock. And it should likewise not penalize
the parents. The Holden decision is thus clearly in the mainstream of
modern efforts to place the illegitimate child in the same, or similar,
position before the law as his legitimate brother. The equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment would seem to require no less.
MYRA. S. GOLDSTEIN
were members of the majority in Levy and Glona. It seems unlikely that these four
Justices would uphold New York's filiation requirement for establishing paternity on
the basis of an "absolute bar" analysis, although they used this approach in discussing
the mother relationship. 401 U.S. at 557 n.26 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.33 (1959), which provides:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of public welfare when notified of
a woman who is delivered of an illegitimate child, or pregnant with child
likely to be illegitimate when born, to take care that the interests of the child
are safeguarded, that appropriate steps are taken to establish his paternity ....
See also Krause, supra note 32, at 350.
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